The President has directed that the bureaucracy must not be politicised in the new district governments system. To prevent the victimisation or harassment of any official, he advised a rethink of that little gem in the as yet unpromulgated new local government law mandating disciplinary action against a district coordinating officer (DCO) transferred twice on the complaint of Nazims.

It is, however, difficult to see how this seemingly simple directive will be operationalised. The drastic provision cited by the President is, after all, one of many intended specifically to subordinate the DCO (and the entire bureaucratic structure beneath him) to the elected Nazim. Thus, to an extent, politicisation of the bureaucracy is a natural corollary and the intended objective of the plan. This, in fact, is the main and conscious shift from the existing paradigm.

The conceptual basis of the administrative model bequeathed by the British was the insulation of officials from parochial and political influences. The rationale was that, given the extended family and social linkages of the society, local officials would succumb to clannish influences and fail to deliver a fair, firm and neutral administration. The system worked efficiently to deliver the assigned tasks of control, revenue-collection and, in exchange thereof, physical security and justice to the people.

But after independence, as the "will of the people" became an important factor in their governance, a conflict developed between the insular, and often insolent, bureaucracy and the increasingly assertive politicians. Because a formal and consciously-designed institutional change from an insular and control-orientated bureaucracy to a service-delivery model was not made, political inroads were made informally and negatively at the cost of merit, competence and neutrality of the system.

During the last democratic interlude, officials fell completely under a de facto control of the politicians. In what had practically become the "spoils system" (minus its merits), they slavishly served their political masters - which did not necessarily mean serving the people. In the vicious dog-eat-dog struggle for survival, official neutrality and rule of law were replaced by personalised loyalties (and personal profit for the politico-bureaucratic nexus of opportunists).

This was a sea-change from the non-political and non-partisan British model. The conflict between its conceptual impulses and the changed operational reality, and the fatal divorce of power from responsibility, underlay the administrative dysfunction, corruption and lawlessness.

Consequently, one of the reform challenges was to reconcile power with responsibility (which became the NRB's theme song). The other equally important equation to balance was of "democratic control" versus "operational autonomy" of the bureaucracy (subject, naturally, to politically assigned goals and performance accountability). On how well these two equations are balanced would largely depend upon the performance of the new system.

However, far from being a zero-sum game (as it is often perceived by the two antagonists), power and responsibility have to be shouldered both by the politicians and professionals - but within their specified areas, without coming in each other's way. The test of the NRB is to define these spheres, and build checks and balances against either party transgressing these.

How this challenge is addressed remains to be seen because, as the Presidential directive indicates, the long-delayed local government law is still in the oven - even as the August 14 deadline is only a fortnight away. Apparently, the NRB is still tottering between two stools in seeking the optimum balance for the two critical equations.

The slightest imbalance could leave the bureaucracy vulnerable to opposing pulls. While the initial appointments have been made by the provinces in the absence of the Nazims, the latter may not fancy the officials they inherit (sometimes, for good reasons). More importantly, the working of the system has to be visualised in the longer-term to judge its capacity to manage the politico-bureaucratic tensions, which will be inevitable in the initial phase (and could be exacerbated if the province-district equation is not harmonised).

As originally conceived, the new system compelled the bureaucracy (and the technocracy), to cultivate the Nazim to win his nomination for key assignments. How the officials could do this and still remain neutral, is an unanswered question. How, and on what criteria, will the Nazim chose between officials, is another.

Then, after nomination by the Nazim, the top officials would need ratification by the district assembly. And if the Nazim gets annoyed, they would need the assembly's support to thwart a premature ouster. This maze of checks and balances - between the mayor and the assembly, on the one hand, and the officials and the mayor-assembly, on the other - was conceived no doubt to maintain political supremacy and a modicum of official autonomy.

But given past experience, it could easily turn into an endless trapeze act for the officials. A DCO, the top district official, who displeased a second Nazim, no matter what the reason, had been left looking down the barrel. What this sword of Damocles would do to official neutrality is obvious enough.

And, that isn't all. Subjected to such intense political control at the district level, the officials would simultaneously, be employees of the provinces (the federation, in the case of police and administrative officials) which will control their careers and expect of them political neutrality. Given this dichotomy, where will their loyalties lie in case of a conflict between their employer and the controller? Is this not putting them in two boats, which may even be sailing in opposite directions?

It seems, therefore, that, in attempting to wed the neutrality and autonomy of the old system with democratic control of the new, the already harassed officialdom could be placed in an impossible situation. Quizzed about this quandary after the new plan was unfurled a year ago, General Musharraf had assured that a solution would be found by August 2001. It obviously hasn't been found so far, compelling the Presidential directive.

Without balancing operational autonomy of the officials with their democratic accountability and, crucially, without giving them a stake in the success of the new system, an adversarial equation would be built into it. This challenge seems more nettlesome than it should be mainly because most problems that have plagued our systems, even the well designed ones, are extra-systemic and intangible.

How, for example, will the mindset of the people be changed - be they voters, elected representatives or officials? It needs an all embracing socio-cultural reformation which can obviously not come over-night. Considering the state of runaway poverty and creeping literacy, it is difficult to see it coming soon. That being so, no matter now well designed the new system may be, it will face acute colic pains, teething troubles and, in some cases, even juvenile delinquency. Maturity will, hopefully, come with age - but only if the new system is not molested by the control obsession which had undercut previous democratic experiments.

Similarly, the politico-bureaucratic equation will eventually stabilise as much by the establishment of healthy traditions as by the systems and laws crafted for the purpose. The exercise of power is, as the Western experience suggests, kept on track as much, if not more, by the pressure of public opinion as by the political and legal mechanisms of accountability. This crucial check should also grow with experience.

Another potential pitfall is that the new system will be manned by, and entirely dependent on, the very same underpaid, corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy which is the prime justification for the change. How will the Nazims reform its mercenary culture and enhance its depleted performance-capacity when they are unlikely to have significantly more resources or better skills to do so?

Thus, considering the hazards and uncertainties that still envelop the new district governments, and the turmoil the changeover will entail, it seems unwise to promise instant miracles to the people. The new system will need time and good faith to prove its critics wrong.

Meanwhile, the bureaucracy must also introspect. There is so much the laws and systems can do to guard its non-political character and operational autonomy. No law, after all, had compelled it to go political in the past. Only its own ambitions had led it, first, into a collision with the political rulers and, then, collusion with them for mutual profit. To win back public trust, it needs to build a moral majority within and cast out the reprobates who have brought ill repute to the institution.

The author is a freelance columnist