Speaking at a seminar on arms-control, President Pervez Musharraf forthrightly conceded that, despite the deweaponisation drive, law and order has not improved. Giving an emotional account of his condolence conversation with Mrs Shaukat Mirza, he said unchecked ethnic and sectarian killings could destabilise the country psychologically and economically.

Economic stagnation, poverty and crime feed off each other and have combined to demoralise the people and damage the country. The survival question, therefore, is: how can this self-reinforcing and destructive cycle be broken?

President Musharraf said he receives silence in answer to this question. Understandably so because, as he acknowledged, law enforcement is a long, complex and arduous process. There indeed are no quick fixes. His mix of emotions, analysis and frustration are shared by many, but he could add the crucial bottom line by vowing to take on "the blood-thirsty terrorists" who are holding our "places of worship and centres of economic activities" hostage.

His comprehension of the inter-locking role of law enforcement institutions and the resolve to undertake composite reforms should, hopefully, rectify a critical failure of past civil and military rulers. Seeing no instant political profit in the backbreaking task of institutional reform, the unavoidable pre-requisite to any improvement in law enforcement, they either ignored the issue (General Ziaul Haq) or, having undercut institutional performance by destroying merit, sought quick fixes in ham-handed crackdowns (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif).

Also, as debt began to bite, "non-development expenditure" on law enforcement became an economic sin. Thanks to this penny pinching over the last 20 years, economic development is now held hostage by lawlessness. Before proceeding further, please consider these examples of the proverbial long arm of the law catching up with criminals. In Alameda county of San Francisco's Bay Area, a Mexican gentleman faced the court for issuing a dud cheque. On his way home, he had paid for his air-ticket through a cheque. Anyone who has a driver's license (which is also the identity card) is entitled in the USA to have his cheque accepted - until one bounces, and the trouble begins.

The gent flew off, but his cheque bounced. Many years later, he returned to the US and was stopped for a traffic violation. As standard practice, the police officer radioed his driver's license number to the control-room and was promptly informed of the outstanding arrest-warrant for the bounced cheque. Hence, the day in court.

The incident underscores the old axiom of law enforcement: it is not the severity but the certainty of punishment which deters crime. As long as there is a reasonable chance of evading punishment, even capital punishment will remain a hollow threat.

A more serious illustration is one we are all familiar with: Aimal Kansi's daring revenge on his CIA handlers and the great escape to Pakistan. Given the inhospitable terrain of the tribal area where he could hide, he seemed safe from the law. He would indeed have been so, had the law and its enforcers been Pakistani.

But the message Uncle Sam sends to those it considers terrorists is that they can run, but not hide. The first raid on Kansi's house in Quetta was based on satellite photos of 24 hours ago. It failed because he had left some hours earlier. The next time, he was already airborne when the news stunned his countrymen. He is now on the death row, awaiting the lethal injection - which the unrepentant and enigmatic Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma bomber, had invited by waiving his legal rights.

There is also Ramzi Yousaf, bundled off from Islamabad, the relentless noose around Osama Bin Laden and many other examples of the law eventually catching up with the wanted. The West has won the war against "terrorism" through sheer hard-work and unflagging determination. The law-breaker now has to reckon both with the certainty and the severity of punishment.

Pakistan makes an obvious and glaring contrast. How many terrorist killings have we suffered, and how many terrorists have we hanged? Only Haq Nawaz, the killer of an Iranian diplomat, comes to mind. And even that had caused a major commotion - with the government actually postponing the execution to give him more time to win a reprieve from the relatives of his victim!

Worse still, the conspiracy behind the killing was never unearthed and we don't know who the real mastermind was. Considering the hundreds of terrorist-killers who remain untraced, is it surprising then that ethnic and sectarian terrorism has become a thriving industry? And, who knows how many other agendas are being pursued in the garb of such killings?

Even so, it has been argued before in this column, the only, the obvious and lasting solution is to rebuild institutional deterrence. An effective network of state institutions, thoroughly professional and inter-locked, will deter the criminal by guaranteeing both the severity and certainty of punishment.

This network - comprising the intelligence outfits, police, prosecutors, courts and jails - forms the criminal justice system which applies the state's coercive power. The lawlessness and insecurity are a cumulative effect of the continuing dysfunction of all component institutions of this system.

Although it is difficult to assign blame proportionately among them, police bear the brunt of the criticism. Primarily, because they lay the investigative foundation on which dispensation of justice rests. A botched investigation hamstrings the prosecutors and leaves the courts with no option but to acquit the accused. A good investigation, on the other hand, forecloses the acquittal option - prosecutorial and judicial inclinations to the contrary notwithstanding.

Thus, while the President touched on the role of each component of the law enforcement system, his main focus was on police reforms. No doubt improved logistics and better training are crucial, but cleansing the police of the crooks who have bought their way in is absolutely vital. This Gordian knot ought to have been cut by now. Allowing it to linger lets the invidious linkages subvert the effort.

Another thing that and can be done instantly is to put the right persons in the right job. This elementary and eternal principle of management is the starting point of any reform. It also costs no money. If the entire police hierarchy, from the IG through the district police chief to the all important SHO, is operating on the same wavelength and pursuing the same collective goal, immediate improvement in police performance should be visible. But even one break in the chain will disrupt systemic harmony and performance.

Now that the police are being given more powers and resources, the ball would also be squarely in their court. The common perception is that, given their culture of brutality and extortion, the police will run amok. Allowed half a chance, the sub-human lower echelons would certainly do that. But there are enough honourable police officers who realise the immense responsibility placed on their shoulders and the need to respond to the challenge. If they fail now, there will only be themselves to blame - the colonial law and the district magistrate having been buried.

However, even if police performance improves significantly, its impact will be felt mainly in the arena of ordinary crime. Fighting terrorism is a specialised and full-time job for which a dedicated federal agency is needed - or, perhaps a special wing within the FIA. Simultaneously, terrorism needs to be made a federal crime to enable this agency to lead the investigation with the local police acting as the auxiliary. This is how the US FBI operates.

The anti-terrorist agency would collect and coordinate intelligences, keep tabs on terrorist outfits and individuals, chart their modus operandi and profiles and, thus, provide the institutional memory and continuity needed to pre-empt and pursue terrorists. The over-worked police forget the last killing the moment another occurs.

It is amazing that, despite being ravaged by cross-border and internally spawned terrorism since the Afghan war, the need for such an agency has not been felt. The so called anti-terrorist squads set up by the provincial police are trained more for combat than the crucial intelligence, investigation and prosecution functions.

Physical elimination of presumed terrorists is easy. But, as past crackdowns bear witness, this does not solve the problem. The real challenge is to unmask the demons and take the law to them on a consistent basis. The rest, including deweaponisation, will take care of itself.

The author is a freelance columnist