The critical next phase
Anwar Ahmad
Dec 24, 2001
Even as it began bombing Afghanistan, US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld had notified that Osama may never be found but the Taliban and al-Qaeda would be wiped out. That has been accomplished, with minimal mourning for the uncounted collateral damage--the latest, and hopefully the last, being the bombing death of 65 tribal elders headed for Hamid Karzai's coronation in Kabul.
Like former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright's dismissal of the half-a-million Iraqi children who had died of disease and starvation, the Afghan lives lost were a cost worth paying for US interests. Besides, the US found a mea culpa video to clinch the case it never had against Osama (a 'Saudi dissident' and a CNN-hired expert now tell us that the Pentagon hadn't quite got the translation right and the video, in fact, names nine and not just one of the hijackers!).
As the wobbly interim-administration takes over an Afghanistan ruled once again by chaos and plundering warlords, the arch-villain has done the expected Houdini act and vanished. Unless vaporised and if he has any distinctive feature, like Che Guevara's hands, Osama's remains may be identified decades latter. Meanwhile, he is a roving Saddam Hussain, surfacing here to trigger a strike and then there until the supposedly hydra-head al-Qaeda has been slain. Its 'cells and sleepers' in 60 (Muslim) countries continue to slumber soundly.
Of the next targets, Yemen, has taken the hint and launched a crackdown on al-Qaeda supporters. The 'government' in Somalia has expressed its keenness to welcome US terror-terminators. Saddam Hussain has penned his latest literary gem, a romance set in the backdrop of the 'mother of all battles' he had so convincingly won. The Nobel laureate Kofi Annan having sprung to his defence, the waning villain may rest easy until the bell tolls for him.
Pakistan too is actively engaged, rounding up the bombed-out al-Qaeda fighters fleeing eastward from the Tora Bora mountains. A breakout by the desperadoes cost life on both sides, but earned profuse praise from the US. Meanwhile, the lone American Taliban (John Walker Lindh aka Abdul Hameed) is sequestered aboard a US carrier. Unlike the thousands of other al-Qaeda prisoners, he is a US citizen and cannot be tried by the secret, no-publicity, no-appeal, military courts. In open court, he may recall unsavoury details of the bombs, fire and freezing water that had terminated the inmates of Qala-e-Jangi (war fortress). A minor irritant.
In Palestine, Yasser Arafat has had his aircraft and offices bombed by the Israelis, and his ears boxed by the US. Seeing light, he appealed for an end to violence against Israel and his police gunned down six Palestinians. That is what he was meant to do. Hamas and Islamic Jihad have also suspended their operations in Israel. Given a lull in the cycle of violence, Palestine is where the US can convince the Muslim opinion that its war is indeed not against Islam.
On the surface, this seems easy to do--in exchange for a joint Arab guarantee of its 1967 borders, have Israel vacate the occupied West Bank and Gaza, removing also the Jewish settlements and relinquishing East Jerusalem. But the latter is anathema to Israel. The principle of making the entire Jerusalem an international city laid down by the UN in 1947 is the most reasonable alternative. This will safeguard the sensitivities of all three religions.
But can the US dare to bring Israel around? Very unlikely. The other alternative is the Camp David formula pressed by Bill Clinton during the last days of his presidency. This would give the Palestinians municipal-control ('garbage collection rights') around the Al-Aqsa mosque and East Jerusalem to Israel as its 'eternal capital.' Arafat had then walked out, saying, his own brother would kill him if he accepted these humiliating terms. He is older, tired and chastened now.
On what the US does in Palestine could depend, if it needs to fight a war at all to subdue Muslim militancy. A fair deal in Palestine could defuse the externally infused animus in the Muslim world. But, considering the gung-ho mood in Washington DC, few would bet on this miracle happening. In that case, covert killings and subversion will mark the endless next phase of the US 'war' against terror.
In the sub-continent, too, events are following the American script. Prime minister Vajpayee and his colleagues are dark and menacing caricatures of their American counterparts. Using the parliament attack as 'the last straw,' they are ratcheting up pressure on Pakistan to emulate Yasser Arafat. Pakistan's offer of a joint inquiry was spurned, its request to provide evidence to enable action against the perpetrators swept aside--exactly as the US had derided the Taliban's pleas for evidence. To rub in the insult, New Delhi has ruled out a Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting during the Kathmandu SAARC summit.
Even as Pakistan hints at acting against the Indian-nominated outfits, New Delhi wants a public confession by Pakistan in accepting the bodies of five terrorists killed in the parliament attack who, India says, are Pakistanis. But evidence it will not give. Indian troops are also rumbling towards the LoC and the Indo-Pak border, its ambassador has been recalled from Islamabad, rail and road traffic to Pakistan 'terminated.' As India strides to the brink, whether it steps over could depend on Pakistan giving it sufficient political mileage, or putting up a do-or-die deterrence.
The US continues to play both ends of the stick. Initially, it took the eminently sensible position of asking India to help Pakistan by providing evidence. The White House spokesman had stressed the need for India and Pakistan to use the parliament attack to fight terrorism, and not each other. Even so, the stress has been on Pakistan to do as India says. Then, President Bush himself announced an assets-freeze on Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (Harkatul Mujahideen had qualified earlier, the big-mouthed Jaish-e-Muhammad after the attack on J&K assembly).
But, intriguingly, Bush described Lashkar as a 'Kashmir-based' terrorist organisation out to undermine Indo-Pak relations and President Musharraf. What can this Bushism mean? The freeze itself vindicates the Indian stand. Thus, unless Pakistan acts to its satisfaction, India may see it as a US signal to soften it up. Yet, the 'Kashmir-based' part sort of lets Pakistan of the hook. And the reference to Gen Musharraf seems to drive an unnecessary wedge between him and the government and mainstream public opinion, on the one hand, and him and the militants, on the other.
These are not good signs. Spurred no doubt by the post-11/9 events, Pakistan has resolved to rein in the extremists in pursuance of its own national interest. It is crafting an optimum mix of carrot-and-stick to reclaim the ground conceded to them (in pursuit of the American cold war goals in Afghanistan) without triggering a domestic turmoil. It is critical for these actions to be seen as home-grown. The last thing needed is for the US, after having used Pakistan again, to be leaning on, and lionizing, Gen. Musharraf and India growling at the borders.
That is exactly what the militants may need to bounce back in public esteem after the setback suffered by the obscurantism of the Taliban and the extremism of their guest. Besides, public support for the Kashmiri resistance remains undiminished. A critical factor bonding Gen Musharraf to the people is his avowed aim to salvage the Kashmir cause from the support for the US war effort. If this goal appears under threat even from the US, the militants as Pakistan's 'second line of defence' could make a comeback with all the attendant consequences not only for Pakistan but India also.
Pakistan is at the crossroads here. It is keen to curb the militants and avoid a confrontation with India. But by seeking its capitulation, India is pushing Pakistan on the wrong path without realising that the resulting backlash may not be in its own longer-term interest either. One indication of the dangers Pakistan faces within is the cold-blooded murder of interior minister Moinuddin Haider's brother. By giving evidence to Pakistan, India would have given it a publicly acceptable reason to crackdown on the militants. By resuming talks on Kashmir, India could have eroded the militant cause. Unfortunately, the US has been a bad role-model for the BJP hawks who seem focused on the UP elections.
The writer is a freelance columnist
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