The last phase of the local elections is mercifully over. It was beginning to drag a bit - the empty slogans, the tall claims, and the victory signs. Since the ordinary voter was not involved, the theatrics seemed a little out of place. Anyway, we have our Nazims in position now. This is the new leadership that the NRB had promised us. Or is it? The last names are familiar even if some faces are new. It is not even old wine in new bottles; it is old wine in old bottles.

There is no need to worry too much about this. New leadership is not going to sprout suddenly like mushrooms in a rain-drenched desert. It is a process that is linked to social change and change does not happen overnight. Only our ideologues in the NRB harbour such fantasies. More important is the issue of local governance that will assume centre stage now. The colonial steel frame that ran the country for 54 years has given way to the new order. Will the new set up be able to deliver? This is something we should concentrate our minds on.

The challenge of local governance has not been made easier by a convoluted plan prepared by the NRB. And this brings me to the crux of what is wrong with this government. Its direction is often right but its strategy to get there is not only wrong but also astoundingly immature. This is surprising considering that every major initiative taken by it goes through a long process of internal consultations. There must be something terribly wrong with the decision making process in the army if it cannot differentiate between postures and policy, between humbug and reality.

There is no better example of this than the devolution plan prepared by the NRB. In one full swoop it has done away with a structure of governance that had been in place for a hundred and fifty years. It was not the best of systems and needed to be changed. It also gave inordinate power to the bureaucracy. But, it required maturity to understand that restructuring the state, without a bloody revolution, has to be a gradual exercise.

Revolutions are different because then everything is wiped out. Since nothing remains a new system has to build out of necessity. This has never been an easy exercise and goes through a process of trial and error. What helps of course is that revolutions generally have an ideology, which gives a philosophical framework for the new structure to be put in place. The nuts and bolts are worked out over time. This is what happened in the socialist revolutions of Russia, China, and Cuba etc. This is what is currently happening in Iran.

Nobody, not even the most ardent supporters of the October 12 take over, would call it another October revolution. If anything it was the establishment, or the old structure of the state, asserting itself. It had more the elements of a counter-revolution or more appropriately the substance of a counter reaction against political mismanagement and corruption rather than a revolution. Neither the social order, nor the political order changed in any fundamental fashion. Indeed the trappings of a flawed democracy disappeared but the essence of state and society remained the same.

It is in this setting that the NRB was tasked to suggest a framework for devolution. Devolution is not revolution. It suggests an organised change in the functioning of the state over a period of time. In the end the result might be revolutionary but spread over a long time frame, let us say ten years, it would have plenty of time to be absorbed and to overcome the inevitable glitches. A gradual administrative change also has the advantage of being in harmony with societal change. A lack of calibration between the two will always lead to trouble.

The fact that many people are now questioning the giving of so much power to the old feudal families and the local elite is an example of this lack of calibration. The old bureaucracy was neither very productive nor very popular. Yet the people put up with it because it could, at its best, be neutral. Its role of adjudicating between competing local interests was its most important function. This required not only neutrality but also a sense of detachment from local conflicts. This will change because now there would certainly be no detachment. One can only pray for neutrality in situations of conflict. This is what worries the people.

It needn't have been such a big worry if the process of change had been slow. The local governments of the past did have some very substantial powers. To this could have been added more powers in the critical areas of law enforcement, land management, education, and health. With appropriate safeguards and minimalist approach not only would the people have been less concerned, the Nazims themselves would have learnt to absorb the heady feeling of power. Over time this power could have been increased and more functions of the provincial government devolved to local level. The change over would have been smooth. Now there is a fear of what happens next.

This fear has also prompted many changes in the original draft of the local government plan. The provincial governments have been particularly picky. The only problem is that all the changes are within the ambit of the original flawed plan. For example, Police has managed to take itself substantially out of elected control. This is a big win for it. Magistracy's oversight over police has been eliminated with the elimination of the office of District Magistrate. So who is going to restrain the police?

The DCO or District Co-ordination officer who was principal assistant to the Nazim has also been made more independent. This means that bureaucracy would no longer be as answerable to the elected people as in the original plan. The role of the District Assembly has been minimised to the extent that it has become a virtually redundant body. There are other minor changes all designed to protect the people from a rampant Nazim. The result is that the original plan, while retaining its destructive function of completely doing away with the old administrative structure, has been worked upon to such an extent that its face has been altered. Now we have elements of a strange concoction. It neither looks like partridge nor a quail to freely translate a Punjabi proverb.

All this could have been avoided if Lt General (r) Naqvi was willing to heed the counsel of restraint, of a slow gradual change. Backed by a set up which had no one of any particular learning or experience, he ploughed on heedless. He has been particularly keen on foreign help. People who have no clue about our culture, of our administrative or judicial set up, have been hired at exorbitant salaries. Besides adding to our national debt, we would be stuck with salaries. Backed up by Asia Foundation, UNDP, even the World Bank, all kinds of hair-brained schemes are being worked out in the NRB the wreckage of these fantasies long after Naqvi has retired to his favourite foreign consultancy.

The dye has now been cast. The Nazims would be sworn in on August 14 and a new dawn will emerge on our administrative horizon. My only worry is that if the system does not work, the idea of devolution would also die with it. We need to devolve power to the district and we also need to restructure the state. If the NRB plans do not work, no one would be willing to touch devolution or restructuring ever again. This would indeed by a great tragedy.