United
States, India and deweaponisation
Shafqat
Mahmood
The writer is
a former Senator and a
former
federal and provincial minister
August 24, 2001
This has been
a week of mixed fortunes for the government. General Musharraf has been busy
launching the so-called mega projects. We are told that these will transform the
future of our country. Great news except that somebody should tell us where the
financing is going to come from. The Interior Minister is also claiming success
on the deweaponisation front. Even the Jihadi organisations, he says, are ready
to co-operate. This sound too good to be true, but let us not be cynical. This
is a step in the right direction and should be welcomed.
The story on the
external front is not so good. As weeks roll by, the Agra summit appears, more
and more, to have been a disaster. The rhetoric on the Indian side is becoming
increasingly hostile. The chances of another summit at the moment are bleak if
not non-existent. This is a great setback to peace in the sub-continent and to
the future of two poor countries locked in a deadly conflict. The intensity of
anger on the Indian side can be gauged from the fact that they are not even
ready to play cricket with us. Some of us had hoped that if nothing else came
out of Agra, at least our cricketing relations with India would be normalised.
This now appears to have been a fond wish.
The Americans are
also blowing hot and cold with us. While every spokesperson on their side
emphasises the value of friendship with Pakistan, the reality is that India
seems to be the preferred partner. There is some talk that sanctions imposed on
India will be lifted soon. No such promise is being made in the case of
Pakistan. The ostensible reason is the lack of democracy in our country. There
is some truth to this because there are American laws on the statute books that
automatically target a military dictatorship. However, one suspects that there
is more to it than just democracy. After all, Americans have very cosy relations
with countries that can hardly be called democratic.
The Indian-American
axis - this sounds too conspiratorial and is perhaps incorrect so let us call it
the Indian-American partnership - does have some common concerns as far as
Pakistan is concerned. The American focus on Osama Bin Ladin is very real.
Terrorism against American assets is an important domestic political issue. It
is also seen as one of the few remaining threats to the global power of the
United States. The Bush Administration, therefore, appears determined to take it
head on. This is where the role of Pakistan becomes so critical in their
thinking. They believe that we have a great deal of influence over the Taliban
and that we can coerce them to hand over Osama.
We have always
protested that this is not true. Our plea is that Afghans are a fiercely
independent people and would not take orders from anyone. While not fully
agreeing with this, the Americans have a fall back option. They want us to
cooperate in a military operation to get Osama out of Afghanistan. I am not
privy to what the government thinking is on this subject but my guess is that we
find this option unpalatable. We may have no love for Osama but he is a hero to
many Jihadi organisations in Pakistan. And, if the Urdu press is to be believed,
he is also hugely popular among the ordinary people. No government in Pakistan,
and specially a military government, is willing to risk a Jihadi backlash or a
popular outrage.
On the face of it
then, there appears to be a deadlock between us and the Americans on this issue.
The Indians are watching this situation with a great deal of interest because
they attribute their troubles in Kashmir to the Jihadi organisations. Very often
the same outfits for whom Osama is such a hero. This is where the American and
the Indian interests come together. Jihadi organisations in Pakistan are a
stumbling block to a potentially effective partnership between the US and
Pakistan in sorting out Osama and if necessary, the Taliban. Jihadi
organisations are a thorn on the Indian side in Kashmir. These organisations
thus become a common enemy for the United States and India.
The role of
Pakistani government and particularly the Pakistani military in this Jihadi
equation is an important determinant of our international image. The Indians
have no doubt that what they call cross border terrorism is entirely sponsored
by the Pakistani military. They have been trying hard for many years now to
convince the world about it. The Americans had so far not fully aligned
themselves with the Indian position. While no one denies that they have the
means to know the real situation, it may not have suited them to publicly or
officially to push this line of thinking. Their focus on Osama may have begun to
change this.
When American
officials say that we do not want to loose Pakistan what they really mean is
that they hope that they can convince the Pakistani government to see reality as
they see it. In other words they have not yet lost hope that the Pakistani
military would cooperate with them to take care of the Jihadi problem within
Pakistan and the Osama problem in Afghanistan. The day they start to loose hope,
the rhetoric on Pakistan will completely change. Their propaganda machinery
would start branding us as a state sponsoring terrorism. IMF and other
international financial institutions will change their tune and stop giving us
assistance. We would start to be treated like a pariah.
These were the fine
calculations that may have prompted the Indian Prime Minister to invite General
Musharraf for a summit. They may have thought that Pakistan is in a tight spot
with the Americans and may be ready to play ball on the cross border terrorism
issue. Really, from their point of view if we can scale back the Jihadi
incursions in the IHK, the problem is more than half solved. What they thought
Pakistan would get in return would be a certificate of good behaviour and more
importantly, a message would go to the Americans that our attitude towards the
Jihadis has changed. General Musharraf's forceful advocacy of the Kashmir issue
and insistence that this issue must be resolved before anything else happens
completely dashed their hopes.
While the Indians
may have been deeply disappointed, I wonder what message went out to the
Americans. They continue to welcome the process of dialogue but this is a
diplomatic way of describing a stalemate. How they really interpreted General
Musharraf's rhetoric is another matter. We will not have to wait too long to
find out. Within the next six months, the American attitude would start to
crystallise. If you find the IMF and the World Bank misbehaving, you can bet on
it that we have lost the Americans. If not, then look towards Afghanistan to
find the answer.
It is in this
context that some of the moves made by the government on the Jihadi/religious
organisations front are so interesting. On August 14, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and
Sipah-e-Mohammad were banned. Lashkar and the Sipah have both been dormant
organisations for some time, so it is clear that this step was only taken for
cosmetic purposes. What is more significant is the disarming of the Jihadi
outfits. If this really happens, and I have some doubts on it, the message would
go out loud and clear that there is a change of policy in Pakistan. This would
certainly go down well with the Americans and may also make India less hostile.
Obviously, such
fundamental policy changes that also have domestic repercussions are not played
out in the public domain. They are disguised behind carefully designed smoke
screens. The de-weaponisation drive is the ideal camouflage. It is a real
domestic issue so no one can object to it. Government will only earn praise if
everyone, included the Jihadis, are disarmed. It may also achieve some of our
foreign policy objectives vis a vis Americans and maybe the Indians.
If my analysis is
correct, one can only commend the government for having understood the
fundamentals of the situation for Pakistan so well. If I am reading too much
into these moves, than get ready for a rocky ride.