Shafqat Mahmood

The writer is a former Senator and a former federal and provincial minister

smahmood@lhr.comsats.net.pk

The campaign in Afghanistan is winding down with just a few pockets of resistance left. The Americans are being a bit bloody minded about giving a safe passage to non Afghan fighters in Kunduz. From their point of view it may make sense to kill their potential enemies, now that they are surrounded and gathered conveniently in one place. But, it makes little sense from a human perspective or in the context of universally accepted rules of warfare.

Mankind has been at war with each other for a long time. After centuries of distillation some rules have emerged. If the enemy is ready to surrender he should be allowed to do so with a minimum guarantee of life. Some of the more bloodier conflicts of human history have been resolved in this manner. What is it that Churchill used to say; magnanimity in victory. The Americans need to be magnanimous, now that the back of the Taliban, and may be to an extent of Al Qaeda, has been broken. The rules should not be changed just because of the terrible tragedy of September 11.

I recognise that there are difficulties in this situation that make an easy resolution difficult. There are supposedly thousands of non Afghan fighters in Kunduz. Where would they go and how can they be prevented from carrying on their deadly trade in the future. The only way out is to take them in custody as prisoners of war and transport them to their respective countries. Most of them are in any case wanted men and can be dealt with adequately by their home governments. As far as the leaders of Al Qaeda are concerned, they can be tried in an international court of law, on the same analogy as Milosovic and other Serb criminals. Rampant killings will only add a halo of martyrdom to these people.

This is just one of the problems that lies ahead for Afghanistan. The military conflict is not over yet and may continue for many months before the situation is stabilised. The Taliban are in retreat but at least some are heading for the hills and may keep up a kind of guerrilla warfare. The tensions within the Northern Alliance are simmering below the surface and, if history is any guide, may erupt into open conflict sooner than later. The old warlords are back and busy dividing up the country. Will they ever accept the hegemony of a central government?

The Afghan imbroglio seems as difficult to resolve as it ever was. Two decades of conflict and much killing and gruesome brutalities have hardened postures beyond redemption. Sick as they were in many of their attitudes, the Taliban had brought a semblance of surface unity to the country. It was not built on political or ideological acceptance but on raw power. No one faction has the same kind of raw power any more.

The demise of the Taliban also means that there is no credible Pashtun leadership available to participate in a grand national coalition. King Zahir Shah is at best a symbol but symbols to be successful need universal acceptance. Is such an acceptance visible in Afghanistan? The answer has to be no. The only reason why Northern Alliance may accept him is because he is so weak on the ground. In practical terms he does not amount to much. If he is to be the token Pashtun to legitimise Northern Alliance rule, it will not work for very long.

The only new element in the game is the presence or possible presence of peacekeeping troops on the ground. If the presence is significant, it may provide the kind of raw power to keep everyone on their best behaviour. No one should have any doubt that this multi national or peace keeping force would have to do more than just show the flag. This is a real peace keeping situation where force may have to be used. If the UN or its western supporters are going to back away the moment a gun is fired in anger, it will not work.

The real issue is the degree of commitment the world is ready to make to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The first sign of this commitment would be the readiness to station a real and effective peace keeping force in the country. This force may be required to use firepower to prevent internecine warfare. It may, at times, look like an occupying force. But, short of this nothing would work. If the blue helmets of the UN start to act like toy soldiers, the Afghans would show them up for what they are, very soon.

If this degree of force commitment is supplemented by a serious infusion of rehabilitation money, Afghanistan may well start to roll. Nothing focuses the mind of the Afghans better than money. I don't mean this as a racist remark. All poverty stricken people in the world have a special fascination for money and Afghans are no different. If rehabilitation works start and really begins to change the lives of the people, it would be a great incentive to maintain the peace.

This being the case, the conference of Afghan factions in Germany is in itself just window dressing. If enough pressure is applied, some kind of interim government may emerge. Although everyone present there would have nothing but evil in mind for each other, they will give in to the dictates of the west. Such an Afghan government would not be capable of much but would provide the necessary fig leaf for real activities to pacify and stabilise Afghanistan. Those real activities as I said earlier are the presence of a strong force on the ground and aid dollars flowing in.

Where do we stand in all this? Not somewhere tall for the moment, I am afraid. Any government that comes into being in Afghanistan, at this juncture, would have no special love for Pakistan. This is putting it mildly, there is the possibility of active hostility. Some of our traditional adversaries are already moving in to stir the pot against us. While not welcome, we should not be overly concerned. The logic of the situation will eventually work in our favour.

The moment there is reasonable peace in Kabul, we should open up our embassy and start doing business with the new government. No one is going to be particularly friendly in the beginning but so be it. If the security of our diplomats is guaranteed we should move ahead. Soon enough there would be the need to import stuff, to get wheat and other edibles, to buy cement and construction material, to rehabilitate agriculture and so on. We are in the best position to meet some if not all of these needs. Provided we do not play too many secret games, a workable situation with the Afghans will soon emerge.

The failure of our Afghan policy of the past lies in this simple statement. We have played too many games in Afghanistan. The expression 'great game' was coined by the English in the context of super power rivalry of the nineteenth century to control Afghanistan. Some of our later day warriors took this to mean the imposition of their favourites in Kabul. This game or great game or stupid game has to end. We must recognise once and for all that we do not have the capability to impose solutions in Afghanistan. We must therefore be ready to deal with whoever is in control.

We are in a good position to be a full participant in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Our standing with the international coalition is good. Our proximity is a great advantage. We have the manpower and the expertise. Our industry can provide some of the essentials. If all of this is properly calibrated there is no reason why we should not be given an important role. This is what should focus our mind. Not dreams of glory through some mythical great game. A Pakistan that plays within its capabilities is sure to emerge with honour in the Afghan history of the future.