Shafqat Mahmood

The writer is a former Senator and a

former federal and provincial minister

smahmood@lhr.comsats.net.pk

This phoney war-no war, no peace-is not coming to an end. There is no sign yet of Indian forces withdrawing. Many of us thought that a huge window of opportunity had opened with General Musharraf's speech of January 12. The Indians do not seem to think so. While they grudgingly acknowledge it as a positive declaration of intent, they are not willing to settle for a mere statement. They want its reflection in the ground realities in Occupied Kashmir. This is not likely to happen in a day, a week or even a month. We may be in for a much longer stalemate than most people imagined.

All kinds of theories are being put forward to explain Indian intransigence. The most popular is that the BJP led coalition is waiting for elections in certain Indian states to take place. Presumably, a war like stance against Pakistan would garner it some extra votes. There may be some truth in this but is the political advantage important enough to risk a nuclear war? The movie 'Wag the dog' was a good illustration of how a foreign military encounter is created by American leaders for political advantage at home. However, unlike the Americans, the Indians are not likely to come out of this particular engagement unscathed. Would the leadership in India take such a huge risk for temporary political gain?

There is also the argument that India wants to thwart a possible economic revival in Pakistan. Two reasons are given to explain this. One, that mobilisation of forces itself is a huge financial liability. It is supposed to have cost India 50 billion rupees and it may be in the range of 10 to 15 billion for Pakistan. This expenditure is supposed to hurt Pakistan more as its financial base is weaker. It is also thought that a war like situation, besides affecting foreign investment in Pakistan, would scare away the already shy domestic investor. The situation on this front is already critical and a climate of war will make it worse. Economic revival of Pakistan, it is said, will be stopped in its tracks.

The only problem with these assertions is that they apply to India also. The impact on it may be less severe but it is not insignificant. A fifty billion hit just for mobilisation is not a joke, and foreign investors do not see countries in isolation but look at the entire region. If they see instability and the possible threat of a nuclear war, they are not likely to jump in. The economic impact of these war drums is not just on Pakistan. India will also share its part of the burden.

If it is not just politics and economic damage is shared by both parties then what is it that is holding back a breakthrough? One possible answer can be found in the argument that General Musharraf made these major policy shifts under pressure. The Indians think that his heart is not in the decision to roll back the Jihadis. He is doing it only as a publicity gimmick to appease Western public opinion. The moment the pressure is released with the withdrawal of forces, he will revert back to the same old policy of proxy war in Kashmir. It is for this reason that they are in no hurry to move back. They are risking war and paying a substantial economic price just to ensure that what has been said is also implemented.

I personally think that they are wrong. The major policy decisions announced by General Musharraf have emerged from within the Pakistani political ethos. As I said last week, the pressure to do something about the Jihadis had been growing for sometime. It is just unfortunate that the timing of General Musharraf's speech gives the impression that it was done under pressure. If the same steps had been announced at Agra he would have been hailed as a great statesman, even in India. For tactical reasons, or because he was not sure about the strength of the Jihadi forces, he chose to bide his time. The American action in Afghanistan besides crushing the Taliban, also showed up the strength of the extremist forces in Pakistan. Confident that they will not be able to mount a real challenge, General Musharraf went ahead with the dramatic actions against them. These were good decisions made a few months late. Timing was off but the substance was already in the works.

There are examples from our history where bad timing made a crucial difference. Ayub Khan, under great pressure after months of unrest, announced far reaching political reforms undermining the essence of his self-created constitution. It had no impact what so ever. If he had done this soon after the 1965 war, dangerous political instability in the country could have been averted. Yahya Khan unfolded a constitutional document and installed civilians in his cabinet, as the Indian army was marching towards Dhaka. It did not prevent the division of Pakistan. If he had shown the same spirit of accommodation before March 1971, history could have been different. Doing the right thing at the right time is so critically important.

General Musharraf's timing is not ideal yet his speech has been widely welcomed because it reflects popular sentiment. The people have been saying the same kinds of things about the extremist elements and the Jihadi forces for a long time. That the writ of the state was being undermined is not a new revelation. Neither is the perception that our homegrown terrorists had given Pakistan a negative image worldwide. The difference is that the Army and its Chief are not only ready to acknowledge it but, for the first time, are ready to do something about it. This is the change and that is why this speech is considered such a landmark in our recent history.

The Indians need to recognise this. They should recognise the public support behind the measures announced by General Musharraf. They should be not deluded into thinking that some kind of sustained pressure from the outside will ensure implementation. The pressure is already there, generated from the inside. External threats will only create conditions for a slower implementation. And, if there is war, it will only hurt the people. The extremist forces on both sides will emerge in strength. Non-state actors need space and weak state provides such a space. If a war weakens both India and Pakistan, it will only add to the strength of the extremist forces in both countries.

I was asked the other day, what are the lessons to be drawn from this conflict between India and Pakistan. Since it is not over it may be premature to make a final assessment but one lesson is indisputable. Timing is everything in statecraft. It is not only important to do the right thing, it is important to do it at the right time. Seizing the right historical moment is so crucial. We may have made the mistake in Agra. The Indians are making it now.