Strategic political partnerships
April 20, 2001
The surface calm in the country has been shattered by widespread troubles in Sindh. In particular, Karachi has erupted violently after remaining calm for a long period of time. In an interesting policy shift, the MQM has decided to align itself with rural Sindhi agitational forces. I am deliberately not calling the Paleejos and the Mumtaz Bhuttos nationalist because creating disturbance on a false issue does not serve the cause of Sindh nationalism. This is just political opportunism masqueraded as a battle for the rights of Sindh.
The lack of any credible political partnership for the regime has never been more obvious than now. It stands politically isolated in Sindh at a very critical time. The water shortage is real but the cause is not theft by Punjab or an anti-Sindhi attitude in the government. Yet this is not coming through either in the regime's media handling or in the pronouncements of any of the political players having impact in Sindh.
If the problem was only poor media handling it could be corrected. But, this is not the case. The real problem is the lack of a credible political voice telling people the truth in Sindh. PPP, which is the major political force in the province, has been kept at more than an arms length by the regime. The second largest party, the MQM, has perhaps decided to dispel the notion that it is in cahoots with the regime. They are therefore making a big song and dance about the water shortage. There is no one left to the clear the air.
The PML(Like-minded) are supporting the regime but are neither here nor there in the political landscape of Sindh. Without any popular base of support they are only good for taking up newspaper space. There may be some other groups, put up by the ubiquitous "agencies", trying to do their bit. Relying on them only underlines how bare the cupboard is. The regime is carrying enough baggage to bend its back in Sindh, but there is no one to hold its hand.
This is a problem inherent in all military regimes. While their focus on governance is often sharper they lack public support. Administrative measures however good can only go so far. Without an instrument that directly connects to the people, even the good done gets nowhere. The general confusion created by fiery political rhetoric of the opposition obscures its impact.
The military in the past has not been unaware of the need for political support. Yet, its approach to the issue has been clouded by its prejudices. The military by definition does not like populist forces. They are less amenable to persuasion and often go on tangents that are scary. It feels more comfortable with politically neutral business types or rural landowners interested only in personal advancement. When put together under a convenient political label, often the Muslim League, they readily become junior partners in a military dominated dispensation.
Becoming junior partners comes easily to them because they lack a genuine mass base. Their political success is dependent on heavy support from the administration. In the eyes of the military this is not seen as a disqualification. In fact, it becomes their most endearing quality. They are submissive, reliable, and do what they are told to do. The PML's created by Ayub and Zia are an example of this disposition.
The fact that Nawaz Sharif and Junejo did not follow this script does not diminish the attraction of such elements. The current regime's intense and abiding interest in Muslim League indicates this. PML without Nawaz Sharif is still seen by our military leaders as their best bet for a political partner. That its public support is practically non-existent is not being registered. False theories of their potential support are freely being hawked to impress General Musharraf into adopting them.
He and his colleagues clearly have a soft corner for the Mian Azhar's faction of the PML. Whether he goes so far as to anoint them as his partners is too early to tell. The real question is not whether he chooses them or not. It is, or should be, whether they are of any use to the military as political partners.
In a country divided by problems of ethnicity, regionalism and scarcity of resources, what use are political non-entities. What this country needs is a strategic partnership between genuine political forces and the military. This has not happened so far. The military's biases have precluded a relationship with real political forces that could take the nation forward to progress and prosperity.
A pristine democratic world view would argue that why should military be in the business of having political allies. They should go back to the barracks sooner than later. This may be theoretically correct but it does not take into account either our history or our particular stage of political and social development.
The military's strength is a reality and the possibility of its positive role in national development cannot be ignored. This role has not surfaced properly because in the past, the military has been at loggerheads with genuine political forces. Too much energy has been dissipated on these useless battles. It has neither done the nation nor the military any good. It is this weakness that needs to be remedied.
There is another reason why this matter should be taken seriously. The military's ethnic composition is no secret. It is largely dominated by Punjabis with a smattering of Pakhtuns and Mohajirs. Therefore, Military rule ends up being seen as Punjabi rule. However, unfair this characterisation may be, this is the general perception in smaller provinces.
When the military chooses a hastily put together Muslim League as its political ally this perception gets further strengthened. The reason for this is simple. All the Muslim Leagues put together in the past have been Punjabi dominated. They have found little support in smaller provinces. The same is the case today with PML(Like-minded). This arrangement while comfortable for the military is politically suicidal for the country.
The military needs to open a genuine political dialogue with the leadership of mass based political parties. It is our good fortune that we have at least two political parties who have support in all the provinces of the country. The PML(N) has good support in Punjab and in some areas of NWFP. Some of its people have also won in Sindh and Baluchistan. A dialogue must be established with this party and not with its shadow, PML(Like-minded).
The PPP also has widespread support in Punjab and is the dominant party in Sindh. It has also won seats in NWFP and Baluchistan. It makes no sense to treat it as a pariah. Political parties that cut across ethnic, linguistic or regional barriers, are national assets. They should be treated as such.
The ANP, BNM, PMAP, MQM, JWP, JUI(F) are all important regional parties. There is no reason to treat them with hostility. For too long has the establishment in Pakistan considered them less than patriotic. This is unfortunate. The tendency to arrogate all patriotism to one institution or one province is counter productive and against national interest. This mindset must be avoided at all cost.
It so happens that most of these parties are under the umbrella of ARD right now. The government can do no worse than initiate a dialogue with its leader, Nawabzada Nasrullah. A very basic mistake made by General Musharraf was not to invite Nawabzada for a meeting early on. In fact he should have been the first political leader invited by the military. This opportunity was allowed to pass.
It is not too late though to initiate this process now. This nation would be immeasurably stronger if its military leaders and genuine political leaders were on the same wave length. Everyone wants welfare, progress and prosperity of the nation. Why is it not possible for the military and the genuine representatives of the people to work together? Let us stop the name calling and get on with this. There is no simpler or better way to begin the task of nation building.
The author is former Senator, former federal and provincial minister