The dilemma of legitimacy

Shafqat Mahmood

The writer is a former Senator and a former federal and provincial minister

smahmood@lhr.comsats.net.pk

Mar 22, 2002

There must be some kind of historical irony in this. It is General Ziaul Haq's son who tells us that General Musharraf is planning to hold a referendum in May. There is an old saying that history repeats itself, first as irony and then as a farce. So far we are at the irony stage and with Ijazul Haq at the forefront, certain poignancy is added to the whole thing. It is also a sign of the times that the other gentleman explaining General Musharraf's moves is none other than Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. Remember him. He was last seen breaking down parliament house doors and harassing Public Accounts Committee members. He also has many other 'achievements' to his credit, the most famous being the crash of the Cooperatives. But no one can accuse him of not being a survivor. Whether the regime is military or political, he always has his 'people' in important positions.

The fact that General Musharraf is now beginning to rely on people like Chaudhry Shujaat is an irony of another kind. The president has many attributes but the one that distinguishes him from our recent rulers is his personal honesty and integrity. There is not even a hint of financial scandal associated with him or with the members of his cabinet. This is no small achievement in a polity where money making has been a favourite game of political and military leaders alike. This distinction is now in danger. Not because the general and his colleagues have started to rake it in. No, it is in danger because he is starting to associate with people whose reputation is less than savoury.

The dilemma for General Musharraf is that he desperately wants to legitimise himself. No one can stop him if he just decides to continue as president for the next five years. But he is acutely aware that this is not enough. He wants the mantle of authenticity, of legality. He cannot get this by declaring himself president through executive fiat. He has to choose a method that is acceptable politically, that can pass muster on the bar of legality and that is seen as transparent and fair by people at home and abroad. That is not an easy task and is always a danger zone for military rulers.

The second dilemma for General Musharraf is that he wants to do all of this without coming out into the open in a political sense. He wants to retain his lofty disdain for politics and he wants to remain above the fray. It was always a choice for the general to form his own political party. After all there are a lot of people in the country who support him but would not have anything to do with the existing political parties. Such people could have rallied to his cause and he may have even attracted a lot of new blood into politics. He chose not to do that. Instead he or his advisers started to look for surrogates to achieve his political goals. This gave birth to the famous like-minded, who have now transformed themselves into PML (Q).

The third dilemma for General Musharraf is to choose the right method to legitimise himself. The constitutional formula is that all the provincial assemblies on an equal weightage basis plus the National Assembly and the Senate elect the president. If the referendum news is correct, it seems that the general has decided not to go down this route. It is not difficult to understand why. First, all these legislative bodies come into effect after an election. Who knows what result a fair election would bring? Secondly, General Musharraf would have to go out and seek votes from the elected members. This would mean breaking the veil of political innocence behind which he sits right now. Then, nothing comes cheap in politics. The members would want something in return. There is nothing unusual in this. Just the normal quid pro quo of any democracy. But as far as General Musharraf is concerned, this would further shatter the illusion of his being above dirty politics. I think, considering all this he may well have decided to seek the referendum route.

In a way I am glad because there were other permutations and combinations that some of his political advisers were suggesting. The principal political plan being sold to General Musharraf, and it may still not be dead, was to adopt PML (Q) as the King's Party and make it win the elections. Once this lot was in place, it was proposed, the presidential election would be easy and these people would also stamp their approval on constitutional amendments. This may have looked good to some people, and may still be attractive to president's principal political advisers, but it is a non-starter. The Q party is a sham. It has some good people, like Mian Azhar and Mian Khurshid Kasuri, but it has a great number of unsavoury elements. It also has no vote bank worth the name. Making them win would involve a great deal of pre-election manoeuvring and massive rigging on the last day. This prospect must be daunting for General Musharraf and it has the prospects of tarnishing the image of his real constituency, the army.

Referendum is not a constitutionally acceptable method to elect the president, and its second drawback is that the most reviled dictator in our history has used it earlier. Yet, in these circumstances it may be the least lethal. The People's Party and its allies have already started to attack it but they need to pause and consider. Isn't it better that this issue is resolved before the election? If this matter is out of the way there would be less pressure on the regime to rig the general elections. In other words once the presidency issue is decided, the clout of quislings like the Q party is going to diminish tremendously. General Musharraf may still want a compliant parliament but it is not the same thing as supervising the election of his own electoral college. The parties will and must take a position for or against the general in the referendum but they need to look at this exercise as a way out for the president. If this issue remains unsettled, there is always a danger that he could become a hostage to the Q crowd.

Having said all this, it needs to be noted that the referendum exercise is not going to be easy for the general. If it is a rigged referendum like Zia's, it would give no legitimacy. If it is a fair referendum but the voting is less than fifty per cent, people would say he has been rejected. This would be harsh because in none of the recent elections has the voting been more than 45 per cent but it will give a lot of ammunition to his opponents. Lastly, who is going to bring the vote out? The general has no political organisation. The Q party may have some pockets of strength but it is non-existent in Sindh, Balochistan and the Frontier. So this gun may well have to be fired from the shoulder of the Nazims. Will it work?

All these imponderables are there but it is still important to have a fair referendum. A rigged referendum is a pointless exercise and if it has to be resorted to then it would be better for the general to just declare himself president and get on with it. If the referendum is fair, a certain benchmark for the turn out will have to be devised. In my opinion, if forty or more percent of the people voluntarily turn out to vote, it should not be considered a failure, given our past electoral history. Secondly, if fifty or more percent of those who do turn out, vote in his favour, then the general should legitimately be considered to have received a majority.

General Musharraf is entering the most difficult political time of his rule. In such moments a person's true mettle is tested. There would be enough cynics around him who would advocate all kinds of shortcuts. He must reject anything that is not kosher, that is not above board. His real strength has to be moral. If this is compromised, no amount of gerrymandering would give him the legitimate right to rule.

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