Indian Prime Minister's invitation to General Musharraf has broken the Kargil logjam. The air has been heavy with mistrust since that brutal summer when thousands died in a short but sharp clash.

The change in October 99 did not make things any easier. Many in India held General Musharraf personally responsible for Kargil and the scuttling of the Lahore process. That, they are ready to deal with him now is a significant breakthrough.

It is also a milestone of sorts for this military government. So far it has not received the kind of recognition it desires internationally. The world does not look kindly, in this day and age, upon a government run by generals. An odd visit to Burma, Vietnam or even Egypt is hardly an indication of international acceptability. India's invitation, in a strange way, gives recognition and legitimacy of sorts to General Musharraf and his team.

By this token it is a clear boost for the government. It also means that General Musharraf is not being seen as a stopgap arrangement. India had stated more than once that it would like to deal with an elected civilian government. It may have finally dawned upon them that it is pointless to wait for such a beast to emerge. In a backhanded way it is a recognition that General Musharraf is here to stay. They have decided to deal with whoever controls Pakistan.

A number of reasons are being given for this change of heart. Bhabani Sen Gupta writing in this paper has brilliantly analysed the compulsions operating on the Indian leadership. One particular fact stands out. There is a certain consistency to Prime Minister Vajpayee's desire for normalisation of relations with Pakistan. He came here in 1978 as Foreign Minister and later as Prime Minister. The bus diplomacy in 1999 was a bold stroke. Here is a man with whom Pakistan should do business.

A particularly poignant moment was his visit to the Minar-e-Pakistan. With a single symbolic gesture, an Indian Prime Minister recognised, indeed accepted, the reality of Pakistan. This must have taken some courage considering that his core constituency is inward looking, Hindu revivalist and anti Pakistan. He is clearly ready to go the extra mile. This presents an opportunity and a challenge to Pakistan.

To be fair, General Musharraf has also been consistent in his desire for talks with India. Soon after October 12, he avoided the danger of another clash by removing forces from the border. A certain amount of circumspection is also visible on the line of control. There has been no major clash since the military took over. General Musharraf is right when he says that there can be no lasting friendship between the two nations until the Kashmir problem is resolved. Still, the fact that he is willing to engage in a dialogue whose agenda includes other matters besides Kashmir is significant. It means that there is a genuine desire to move forward.

There is a cynical view that none of the parties really cares for peace; that, this entire business is a charade to impress the various lobbies in the west. In Pakistan's case it is argued that we need billions of dollars from international financial institutions to stave off bankruptcy. This obviously puts us in a very precarious position. The money, it is said, will not flow if we are seen to be warmongers. We will therefore go through the motions, have a series of talks, even engage in summits, only to convince the west that we are serious. If nothing comes out, as nothing will say the cynics, we will accuse the Indians of being intransigent and hope that everybody believes us.

The Indians, it is argued, have similar concerns. Although their financial situation is not bad, $ 42 billion in reserves, they still seek foreign investment and international financial support. Foreign investment is shy of coming in to the troubled regions of the world and support from the international institutions is contingent upon peace moves. More importantly, the gains that the Indians are looking for are on the diplomatic front. India wants to be a member of the Security Council. Its desire for this seat would have greater relevance if it were seen as a peacemaker. The operative word here is seen. In other words they are trying to change perceptions not go in for a real change in the ground situation.

All this may be true or half true. No one loses on the image front by engaging in peace talks. A summit meeting in Delhi would generate huge international media coverage. Both Vajpayee and Musharraf would look like winners shaking hands and smiling at each in the bright lights. If anything this is to the greater advantage of General Musharraf just because military people are less seen to be peacemakers. Still Prime Minister Vajpayee as the host and the initiator of the dialogue would also be a winner. This is how it should be but what next?

Media glare, publicity, posturing etc is like froth that does not last for very long. If there is no substantive progress at summit, the whole thing would degenerate into bad theatre. One danger in summits is that it raises expectations. If nothing real comes out there is bound to be cynicism, depression even anger. The warmongers in both countries would have a field day. The peace initiative would suffer a serious setback. Something however slender has to emerge for the process to go forward.

The Indians have to realise that this may be their best chance for a deal in a long time. Pakistan is being ruled by the military, which is the principle stakeholder in Indo Pakistan relations. Any deal with the military is a done deal in the sense that it would stand the test of time. Politicians are timid when it comes to dealing with India. They are too scared of the military to take a bold leap forward. And rightly so. Benazir was sacked in 1990 for her openness towards India and there is little doubt that what tipped the balance against Nawaz was the Lahore process.

The political situation in India is more complex. Vajpayee does not have the kind of overwhelming power that General Musharraf has. Still, the BJP's nationalist credentials are far more secure than of the other major party, the Indian National Congress. It would have to contend with less sniping from the right if it does take a major step on let us say Kashmir. The chances of this may not be bright but at least the circumstances for a durable peace process have never been better.

So much for the setting and circumstances surrounding the talks. What about substance? General Rashid Qureshi, the government spokesman, has been exhorting India to move beyond its stated position on Kashmir. He does not say so but does it mean that we are ready to go beyond our stated position. Briefly our stated position is that we want a plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the wishes of the people in accordance with the UN resolutions. India says that Kashmir is its integral part and would not discuss any arrangement that goes beyond the Indian constitution.

Now what does going beyond stated positions mean? Some people in Pakistan may like to believe that India would accept integration of the valley with Pakistan in return for keeping Jammu and Ladakh. This may be wishful thinking. There are no indications that any such deal would be acceptable to India. Conversely Some Indians may like to think that Pakistan would accept the line of control as international border. This is also not likely to happen. Where do we go then?

The focus has to be on interim arrangement. None of the parties is in a position for any kind of final settlement on Kashmir. If we insist on our version or they stick to their wish list it would be a deadlock. Deadlock we have had before but on stated positions. I am talking of a deadlock on wish lists that go beyond stated positions. Such a deadlock is more serious because it means that even a move away from the stated positions does not break the logjam. That is why I say there should be a focus on interim arrangements without any of the parties giving up their so-called principled stands.

The only deal that can come out on Kashmir is the one that both parties can live with. For the moment this is only possible if interim arrangements are created that take the process forward without making any of the parties vulnerable to abuse back home. One way out or interim arrangement is to agree on a phased withdrawal of troops from Kashmir.

In our case this would mean withdrawal from AJK and in their case from the valley. It does not mean withdrawal from Jammu, and Ladakh for them or from the Northern Areas for us. It does mean however that the Kashmiri people in the valley would be rid of a brutal occupation. The next step is to create a soft or porous line of control. Let the people move freely between AJK and Kashmir valley. This would further soften the high state of tension in the region.

What about internal security in Kashmir? Well, if the United Nations is ready to station peacekeeping forces in East Timor, the Balkans and other places in the world, why not in Kashmir. There would be an onus on us to discourage the movement of Jehadi forces but then that would have to be a part of the deal. What I am proposing is difficult and will not be easily acceptable to any of the parties but it still is more realistic than the wish lists that both sides may carry.

An interim arrangement would defuse the tension, and create circumstances for withdrawal from other charged spots such as Siachin and Kargil. It would also mean that we can then begin to move forward on a hundred other things that neighbours have to contend with. It means ultimately that we can begin to focus on our real issues; poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, poor infrastructure, environmental degradation and many more.

This is a historic opportunity for peace. Let us seize it with both hands.