Legitimising
power
Shafqat
Mahmood
The
author is a former Senator and a former federal and provincial minister
June 22, 2001
The script has
finally begun to unfold. General Musharraf has taken over as President in a
simple but impressive ceremony. Or, so says the clichÈ ridden official handout.
There is nothing simple about the house on the hill, with its silk lined walls,
ornate marble floors and glittering chandeliers. It was built as a palace to pay
homage to the power of the President. In an impoverished land it symbolises
everything that has gone wrong for us in the last fifty four years.
For many years now
there was no power in this house only an illusion and some pomp and show.
Finally the pretender, who had nothing more important to do than tell ribald
jokes, is out and power finds its rightful place besides the glitter and gold of
the Presidency. Give unto Caesar what is Caesars. A new era has formally begun.
For the moment,
power and grandeur sit in comfort with each other. How easy this cohabitation
will be only time can tell. General Musharraf has taken over through executive
fiat or as some would say through the power of the gun. This is okay as long as
it lasts but a surer foundation can only be provided by some sort of legitimacy.
Legal and moral icing on the cake of raw power can only come through the will of
the people. How astutely the General handles this transition would be the real
test of his mettle.
Some may argue that
what difference does it make whether he has popular sanction or not. He has the
support of the army, which is the only thing that matters. If this were so,
there would be no need to dress up the nakedness of power. Yet every military
ruler has bent over backwards to somehow get the legitimacy that only comes
through a popular mandate. This has often resulted in a farcical referendum yet
even the ludicrous fig leaf that it provides is eagerly draped around. In this
day and age, gun is not everything. It needs to be covered with flowers.
Ayub Khan sought a
vote of confidence through the newly elected local councillors in February 1960,
fourteen months after coming into power. They voted overwhelmingly in his favour.
Yahya never bothered, there was not enough time. Ziaul Haq waited seven years
before going to the people in November 1984. A bogus referendum in which the
real turn out was less than ten percent endorsed him as President. What path is
General Musharraf going to take?
Clearly he had
little faith in the constitutional electoral college, National Assembly, the
Senate and the Provincial Assemblies, to endorse him as President. In one callow
sweep, he has consigned them to the dustbin of history. All the pleadings of PML-Likeminded
(now know as the PML-Quaid-i-Azam) and the permutations and combinations they
were bandying about, have come to nought. He just did not believe them.
With this option
ruled out, there are only three other possibilities. A referendum through a
direct reference to the people, a la Zia. A referendum only of the elected local
councillors, as Ayub khan did. Or, wait until the new assemblies and the Senate
are elected next year and then ask them to do the trick. None of these options
is easy. Each one has a catch or an obstacle that needs to be surmounted.
Making a direct
reference to the people is the trickiest of the lot. The General has no
large-scale political organisation to get the vote out and ensure positive
results. PML-Likeminded may have looked good on paper but its recent performance
in the local body elections must have dampened the enthusiasm, if any, of its
supporters in the government. They are in no position to assure the General an
endorsement through a popular referendum. I am inclined to rule this one out
altogether.
Waiting for the
elections next year to throw up a compliant electoral college is fraught with
risks. What if it does not happen? Even if enough members who support General
Musharraf are elected, they will demand their pound of flesh. Political wheeling
dealing is something that this lot of generals seems averse to. It reminds them
too much of the bad old days of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto or what they
choose to call the darkest decade of our history. People change and time changes
but somehow I do not see them opting to wait for uncertain pickings.
This leaves the
third option, that is, a reference to the newly elected councillors, a sort of
replay of what Ayub Khan did. It so happens that we have all the conditions
necessary for such a referendum in place. The last phase of the elections will
be over soon and the new breed assumes office on August 14. There is a little
twist however. The trick in Ayub's referendum was to tell the so called Basic
Democrats that their future and in fact of the local body system itself depended
on a positive vote for Ayub Khan. A vote against Ayub was to be a vote against
themselves.
Here is what
Lawrence Ziring has to say 'Given secret ballots, the elected Basic Democrats
were asked to mark them with a simple 'Yes' or 'No'. The future of the Basic
Democracies was said to hinge on the results of the balloting. But, the result
was never in doubt. Having just been elected to the Union Councils and
committees, there was little likelihood that the electors would choose to
dissolve the very bodies they had been elected to serve. When ballots were
counted, less than 3000 voted to reject the system.' (Pakistan in the Twentieth
Century, Oxford, page 259)
What Ziring for
some strange reason does not say is that a major input in getting a favourable
vote for Ayub was that of the bureaucracy. The dreaded Deputy Commissioners, now
discarded under the devolution plan, spearheaded the campaign in each district.
All kinds of methods, including threat, intimidation, bribes, promise of
political office etc were used to get a favourable result. Thus, the political
factor, which he does mention, was only a part of the deal.
If General
Musharraf chooses this route to legitimise himself as President he will be faced
with a slightly different set of circumstances. There is no threat that if the
councillors do not vote for him, the system itself will be dissolved. Ridiculous
as this political condition was in Ayub's time, it does not exist anymore. The
government is committed to the devolution of power and a yes or a no vote by the
councillors has little bearing on the future of the system.
More importantly,
General Musharraf has at his disposal a demoralised bureaucracy that truly hates
this government with a passion. The office of the Deputy Commissioner will cease
to exist on August 14. The DCO or District Coordination Officer will be in its
place but working in a subordinate position to that of the Nazim. This may
change the power equation only slightly but it means that there is no guarantee
of positive results.
There is also
another problem. Media is free and will report with glee any shenanigans that
take place. The West will be watching and any attempt at rigging will surely
have repercussions. As it is, the General's elevation has elicited a stronger
response in the US and Britain and the Commonwealth than he may have
anticipated. Even the Ambassadors of the Western powers refused to attend his,
for a want of a better word, inauguration. Any exercise that General Musharraf
unfolds to legitimise himself would have to have at least degree of transparency
and fairness. Otherwise, it will just not wash.
This places General
Musharraf and his colleagues in a conundrum. If he does nothing there will be no
legitimacy and this is not as unimportant as it may seem to some people. If he
goes ahead and chooses a methodology, it has to be fair and free and recognised
as such by everybody. The route he takes only time can tell but one thing is
clear. He is now firmly astride a tiger. Getting off would not be easy.
General Musharraf
faces a classic dilemma. He is at the top and there are accolades pouring in as
homage to his power. Yet, it is a power that is placed on the thinnest of
foundations. None of our military rulers have departed with their honour and
dignity intact. None of them is remembered with any love. Will the General be
able to transcend this horrific legacy?